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Since the beginning of the present decade, and not 
withstanding a slight revival recorded in the 
majority of countries in 1984, Central America has 
been sunk in the deepest economic depression and 
shaken by the most serious political upheavals of the 
last half-century. The climate of instability and 
confusion which is prevailing seriously hampers the 
search for solutions to political as well as social and 
economic problems, yet the search for such solutions 
is the greatest challenge facing Central Americans 
today, and one which cannot be put off any longer. 
This search should be begun by examining the 
outstanding features of the evolution which has 
taken place in the Central American economies and 
societies since the war and finding out why these 
features underwent so sharp a change towards the 
end of the 1970s. This analysis is presented in 
chapters 1 and II. Chapter HI makes some 
observations on the short-term prospects for the 
region's economies, while finally chapter IV sets out 
a number of proposals designed to form the basis for 
a policy of regional reactivation and development. 
With regard to the latter aspect, the resources 
available in the region are identified and the role 
which intra-regional co-operation could play in 
bringing a process of reactivation and development 
into being is specified, the interaction between the 
economic and social spheres and the political sphere 
is investigated, and finally some observations are 
made on the the role of the State. 
•This article was prepared as part of the basic 
documentation for the Expert Meeting on Crisis and 
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Santiago, Chile, 29 April-3 May 1985), organized by the 
Secretariat of ECLAC 
I 
Main features of 
the style of development 
in Central America 
since the war1 
The origin, scope and possible consequences of 
the crisis cannot be understood without 
analysing the main features of the evolution of 
the economies and societies of Central America 
since the war. The first aspect which strikes one 
is the dynamic growth achieved over a thirty-
year period —naturally with differences from 
one country to another— within an atmosphere 
of financial and monetary stability. A second 
striking aspect is the decisive influence of 
external factors, which have been essential 
determinants not only of economic behaviour, 
but also of the mutual influence of many political 
factors. Here He the historical roots of the 
repeated propensity of Central Americans to 
seek abroad the explanations and solutions for 
the problems affecting them. Furthermore, the 
fragmentation of Central America since the 
short-lived federation broke up has also 
contributed to the fact that each of the countries 
has resigned itself historically to having a scanty 
margin of action with regard to its own fate, due 
to the preponderance of factors beyond its 
control. 
A third noteworthy feature is that, in the 
thirty years since the end of the Second World 
War, most of the considerable changes 
undergone by the economies of the region have 
been simply superimposed on the economic and 
social structure that already existed, without 
bringing about any essential changes in it: a 
process referred to in the present study as 
"superimposed development". 
Finally, the fruits of the long period of 
economic expansion which took place after the 
war were distributed in a flagrantly inequitable 
'Sections I and II of this paper are updated versions of part of 
the text of ECLAC (1983a). 
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manner between the different strata of the 
population, within the framework of a 
concentrative (or at least exclusive) process, thus 
preventing any significant relief of the extreme 
poverty which persists in the region. 
1. Economic growth 
The first feature of the development of the 
Central American countries during the last three 
decades was undoubtedly its sustained 
dynamism. The gross domestic product of the 
subregion as a whole grew at the rate of 5.3% 
per year in real terms between 1950 and 1978, 
although of course there were differences of, 
degree between the various countries, with the 
highest rates corresponding to Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica and the lowest to Honduras. As a 
result, the per capita real income practically 
doubled during this period. Even between 1970 
and 1978, when the subregion had to face 
particularly severe problems —the rise in 
hydrocarbon prices, imbalances in the 
international monetary and financial field, 
shortages of raw materials and of some 
foodstuffs in 1974-1975, various droughts and 
three large-scale natural disasters— the real 
average growth rate exceeded 5.6% per year. 
Some other features of this growth may also 
be noted. First of all, during the 28 years in 
Table 1 
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question negative growth rates were recorded on 
only a very few occasions, almost always 
associated with some natural disaster (twice in 
Honduras and once in Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica). Secondly, while there were frequent 
—almost annual— cyclical fluctuations, these 
took place against an overall background of 
notably stable growth. Cyclical drops were only 
brief, and only exceptionally did the product fall 
for two years running in any of the countries. 
Finally, the cyclical evolution of the gross 
domestic product of the five countries showed 
great similarity, reflecting both their common 
form of insertion in the international economy 
and the high degree of economic 
interdependence achieved through the 
integration agreements of the 1950s and 1960s 
(see table 1 and figure I). 
The most dynamic sector was generally 
manufacturing, propelled by the expanded 
market and the industrial development policies 
created as part of the integration process. As a 
result, the degree of industrialization of the 
subregion rose from 12.3% in I960 to 16.8% in 
1978. 
2. The decisive influence of the 
external sector 
The sustained manner ¡n which the Central 
American economies grew largely reflected the 
long boom in the international economy which 
followed the Second World War. During that 
period, the industrialized countries grew at a 
cumulative annual rate of 5.0%, while the 
volume of world trade expanded at the rate of 
9.0%. Albeit in different degrees, all the 
countries of the region managed to take 
advantage of the situation: the value of their 
exports of goods and services to the countries 
outside the subregion increased by a factor of 
thirteen between 1950 and 1978, rising from 
US$ 250 million to US$ 3-2 billion, while the 
export sector diversified significantly, both as 
regards the composition of its products and their 
geographical destination.2 The boom in the 
'For the region as a whole, the main export product of each 
country in 1950 contributed 70% of total foreign exchange income 
from exports of goods. This percentage declined by almost half by 
traditional export sector also created sufficiently 
easy conditions to facilitate the bold decision to 
adopt mutual free trade in virtually all products 
originating from the subregion within a space of 
not more than five years. This was responsible 
for the intensive industrialization process which 
eventually became a second source of growth, 
although this never ceased to depend ultimately 
on the evolution of the traditional external 
sector. The comfortable economic situation 
referred to, together with the' intensive process 
of modernization in the subregion, also helped 
to create consumption patterns in certain strata 
of the population which imitated those of more 
advanced societies and accentuated demand for 
imported goods. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the external 
sector of the Central American countries 
underwent significant changes. The relative 
importance of foreign trade tended to grow 
—the export and import coefficients for the 
subregion as a whole rose from 18.6% and 
16.3% respectively in 1950 to 30.4% and 33.6% 
in 1978;3 the structure of exports and imports 
changed radically —the former included a 
growing proportion of non-traditional articles, 
while within the latter the proportion of 
intermediate and capital goods increased; intra-
Central American trade grew rapidly until it 
accounted for a high and growing portion of the 
total exports of each of the countries, while at 
the same time also accounting for an 
increasingly high proportion of their total 
imports; and movements on the capital account 
became more and more important as the gap on 
current transactions tended to widen and new 
sources of international financing, both public 
and private, became available. As a result, the 
mid-1970 (36.1%), chanks to the diversification of the export 
sector, although it rose again to 45% in 1978 as a result of the high 
prices of coffee which predominated that year, since the weight of 
this commodity in the total value of exports is high. Furthermore, 
in 195080% of Central America's external trade was with a single 
country (the United States of America), but this percentage 
declined to 35% in 1978. 
'If reciprocal trade is excluded from these figures, the export 
coefficient for the region as a whole evolved from 18.5% in 1950 to 
16.7% in I960 and 23.5% in 1978; the coefficients of extra-
regional imports in these same years were 16.2%, 19.8% and 
27.3%, respectively. 
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Figure I 
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servicing of the external debt began to absorb an 
increasingly large proportion of the foreign 
exchange generated by exports of goods and 
services. 
Even so, throughout this period of growth, 
diversification and change in the external 
relations of the region, the eseential features of 
those small agricultural export economies 
persisted: the evolution of the external sector 
largely explained the global economic behaviour 
of the economy, while the restrictions 
originating in that sector set the limits on the 
rate of domestic economic activity. A direct 
relationship is thus observed between the level 
of exports on the one hand and the rates of 
economic expansion, capital accumulation, 
investment, procurement of fiscal revenue, level 
of employment and import capacity on the 
other. 
External financing acted as a shock absorber 
during periods of contraction, preventing drops 
in the value of exports from being reflected 
automatically in a restriction on the capacity to 
import (and hence on the growth capacity of the 
economy), and at the same time it facilitated the 
process of "superimposed development" 
referred to below. When weakening of external 
demand coincided with restrictions on the flow 
of external financing (which served at least 
partly to make up for the drop in exports), 
however, the restrictions originating in the 
external sector had the effect of slowing 
economic growth and even bringing about a 
contraction in economic activity in real terms. 
The influence of external factors on events 
in the countries of the subregion was not limited 
to the economic sphere. Some of the 
consequences of Central America's dependence 
on exports profoundly affected the shaping of its 
societies and the political order prevailing in 
them. It is well known, for example, that the 
cultivation of one or two basic export products 
had a decisive influence in fixing the division of 
labour, because of the intensive and seasonal 
nature of labour requirements for such crops. 
The availability of labour has thus played a vital 
role in the economic development of the region 
as well as in defining the dual and 
interdependent nature of export and subsistence 
agriculture, and these facts largely explain, in 
turn, the inequitable income distribution 
structures. 
The organization of the Central American 
economies around one or two export products 
profoundly influenced also the "patterns of 
authority": the symbiotic relation between the 
dominant economic groups (agricultural 
exporters and traders) and governments, the 
legacy of corruption from colonial times, and the 
repressive methods used historically to ensure 
the availability of labour have helped to 
consolidate the authoritarian and non-
participative systems characteristic of the period 
since the war, which have taken different forms 
from one country to another, or within a single 
country at different times (the main exception 
being Costa Rica). 
Furthermore, factors of external origin have 
also decisively influenced the political 
interaction in the countries of the subregion. 
The virtual hegemony exerted by the United 
States since the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty in 1850 has found a new expression in the 
period since the war because of the latent conflict 
existing between the two main superpowers of 
the world. This is not the place to go into detail 
about the role of United States foreign policy in 
Central America —a topic which has been the 
subject of many studies in recent years—, but it is 
worth stressing the considerable influence 
which the United States has achieved in the 
region. It is not a question, of course, of claiming 
that the United States has an omnipotent role or 
of insinuating that Central American events 
depend largely on the designs of one or other of 
the superpowers, since the interaction between 
the national political actors has its own 
dynamics, but it may nevertheless be maintained 
that the United States has shown a capacity for 
fixing the limits of political interaction in the 
countries of the region by putting its weight on 
the side of the national actors whose position is 
closest to the objectives of its own foreign policy. 
The preferences of United States policy have 
not always formed a coherent set of objectives: 
some administrations have been mainly 
concerned with security —above all the 
"containment of communism"— while others 
have been more interested in gradual orderly 
change towards more pluralistic and equitable 
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societies. In this respect, United States 
governments have sometimes supported 
national actors who advocate orderly and 
peaceful changes, within the framework of a 
foreign policy vis-a-vis the Latin American 
countries which some authors have called 
"idealistic". This happened, for example when 
the United States favoured the heterogenous 
alliances which overthrew dictatorships in 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras in the 
period following the war, or the governments 
which promoted changes under the "Alliance for 
Progress" in the 1960s, as well as the possibly 
somewhat reluctant support given to the 
similarly heterogenous alliance which took 
power in Nicaragua in 1979. On other occasions, 
the United States Government has preferred to 
help national actors who, in its opinion, have the 
best qualifications for ensuring a minimum of 
stability in the face of radical challenges to the 
status quo. The best example of this more 
"realistic" policy might perhaps be the support 
given by the United States Administration to the 
forces which overthrew the elected government 
in Guatemala in 1954.4 
At all events, when contradictions have 
arisen in United States foreign policy —as 
happens fairly often— between the objective of 
"It has to be acknowledged that the swing from "realism" to 
"idealism" in United States foreign policy is a simplified 
description. Nevertheless, it is based on deep analyses such as the 
description provided by Dexer Perkins (1962, pp. 136-155) of 
cycles of "quietism" and "activism". On other occasions it is based 
on what Stanley Hoffmann (1968, pp. 177 and 178) describes as 
"dualism" in the United States approach to foreign policy, one of 
whose expressions involves speaking two distinct languages, 
neither of which is completely convincing and which are hard to 
reconcile. The first of these is the language of power, the second 
that of shared interest and harmony. Hoffmann himself observes 
rather more graphically that only a symbolic eagle is capable of 
easily holding both arrows and an olive branch at the same time. 
Finally, the realism alternation between "realism" and "idealism" 
in foreign policy also finds support in the recent description made 
by Huntington (1981, pp. 3, 42, 64 and 68) of the United States 
political system, one of whose essential features is the distance 
between political ideals and political reality. Huntington 
acknowledges that this "distance" exists in all societies but asserts 
that the United States is special in the way it deals with the 
problem, namely, through four different responses which 
nonetheless form part of a "cyclic pattern" beginning with 
"moralism", which seeks to eliminate it; then falls into "cynicism", 
through which it tolerates it, moves on to "complacency", which 
seeks to ignore it, and ends with "hypocrisy", in which it denies the 
existence of such a problem and thus returns to the beginning once 
again with "moralism". 
promoting orderly change and that of avoiding 
threats to security, the United States 
Government has invariably preferred to support 
those actors in each country which it has 
considered most capable of defending its own 
interests. It is in this way that the various 
Administrations of that country have managed 
to fix the geopolitical limits referred to earlier. 
3- Superimposed development 
The economies and societies of the Central 
American countries are very different from what 
they were 30 years ago, not only in quantitative 
aspects —the gross domestic product rose from 
US$ 1.95 billion to US$7.52 billion (at 1970 
prices) between 1950 and 1980, while over the 
same period the population rose from eight 
million to over twenty million inhabitants— but 
also because important qualitative changes have 
taken place. The societies are much more 
segmented and pluralistic, a noteworthy feature 
being the appearance of middle-income strata 
attributable partly to the progressive 
urbanization (only 16% of the population lived 
in urban areas in 1950, compared with 43% in 
1980); the importance of secondary sector 
activities in the economies has increased (their 
relative participation rose from 14.6% to 24.1% 
between the two periods in question), and in 
general the system of production has been 
modernized and diversified year by year. The 
different geographical regions of the countries 
are now much better integrated, thanks to heavy 
investments made in the physical transport and 
communications infrastructure, and advances 
have also been made in the provision of 
education and especially health services. These 
changes are to be attributed essentially to the 
"spillover" caused by the style of development 
which has prevailed in all of the countries 
—albeit with specific characteristics from one to 
another— over the whole period under analysis. 
It may be considered that these changes have 
generally speaking been the only ones permitted 
by those who have had the possibility of keeping 
changes within certain limits, outstanding 
among these actors being those who obtain their 
economic power from the agricultural export 
pattern which is so vital for this type of historical 
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development in the region. Consequently, it may 
be seen that the considerable changes which 
have taken place in the three decades since the 
war are characterized essentially by the way in 
which the new economic and social strata have 
simply been juxtaposed with the existing ones, 
within a process of change and modernization 
which has not threatened in essence the existing 
economic structure. 
The foregoing is simply another way of 
explaining a process of gradual peaceful change: 
as long as the pre-existing structures are not 
eliminated, then all the changes which take place 
in patterns of development must, by definition, 
be of an additive or superimposed nature, 
although this does not mean that they should 
necessarily be scorned for this reason. 
What it is desired to stress here, however, is 
that when these changes have seriously 
threatened the existing structures and vested 
interests, they have almost invariably 
encountered their limit, above all when the 
interests of the dominant groups have been 
identical —as has frequently, but not always, 
occurred— with those of the main international 
actor in the Central American political arena in 
the terms already referred to in previous 
paragraphs. Thus, peaceful and orderly changes 
or reforms have had to comply with very tight 
limits in most of the countries of the region. To 
put this another way, economic progress has led 
to substantial social change, with many groups 
rising in the income scale and the formation of 
middle classes, but the maintenance of this 
historical pattern of development has meant 
that there has been only a slow and halting 
advance by the political institutions. 
Th i s e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
"superimposed development" has frequently 
obliged governments to seek substitutes for 
changes which perhaps run the risk of exceeding 
these limits. Thus, for example, recourse was 
had to external financing partly in order to 
postpone or take the place of increases in the tax 
base; State land was distributed in programmes 
called "colonization" instead of reorganizing 
land tenure systems, and external saving was 
used as a substitute (instead of a complement) to 
the inadequate machinery for tapping national 
saving. 
By the same token, the tax burden came to be 
an interesting indicator of the limits which 
"superimposed development" had to face in 
Central America. Although important changes 
took place within the taxation system in all the 
countries —as a reflection of the changes which 
were taking place within the system of 
production— it is curious that the amount of 
fiscal resources procured, as a percentage of the 
gross domestic product, remained constant in 
some countries or only grew very slowly in other 
(see table 2). Furthermore, this coefficient of 
taxation was extremely low compared with that 
of other countries of similar economic and social 
structure, and this circumstance should not be 
considered a mere accident: organized business 
Table 2 
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Table 3 














































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
circles in all the countries —albeit to different 
degrees— stubbornly resisted rises in levels of 
taxation, especially taxation on production and 
income. The financial restrictions due to the 
smaller procurement of fiscal revenue severely 
limited the capacity of the public sector to play a 
more active role in development, while the 
modest increases achieved in the coefficient of 
public expenditure (see table 3) were 
increasingly financed through greater 
indebtedness, especially of external origin. 
The limited participation of the public sector 
in the gross domestic product, as measured 
through the procurement of tax revenue and 
central government expenditure, also fitted in 
with the "anti-dirigisme" position of the 
dominant groups in Central American societies. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the public sector was 
gradually taking control of such public services 
as the generation and distribution of electricity, 
telephone communications, rail transport and 
the management of ports, while State activity 
was also strengthened with the establishment of 
public development banks and institutions for 
regulating the prices of commodities. In all 
countries, however, the public sector 
scrupulously avoided participating in activities 
of interest to private enterprise, the main 
exception to this rule being the Costa Rican 
financial intermediation system. 
Another example of the persistence of prior 
structures in these processes of change was the 
low level of backward or forward integration of 
traditional agricultural export activities, in the 
sense that the sectors depending on these have 
not tried to diversify systematically in order to 
invest in more complex activities. The new 
agricultural export activities (cotton, sugar and 
beef) were thus limited to repeating the pattern 
of traditional commodities, with their scanty 
linkages with other productive activities. In 
other words, the traditional producers 
diversified very little, and the State shared only 
slightly in the surplus generated by them. It will 
thus readily be understood how the traditional 
economic and social structures persisted and the 
changes mentioned were simply superimposed 
on them without succeeding in altering them in 
essence. In other words, the changes occurred 
only within relatively narrow limits (although 
these varied somewhat from country to country). 
Thus, despite the considerable expansion and 
change which took place in the Central 
American economies and societies in the 30 
years following the war, that change was, 
paradoxically, not sufficient to meet the growing 
expectations of numerous sectors of the 
population. Furthermore, the instinctive desire 
to preserve vulnerable social systems led to the 
maintenance in most of the countries of the 
existing economic patterns —which were able to 
take advantage of the boom in the international 
economy— based on political institutions that 
were of an exclusive nature, at least as regards 
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the distribution of power and of the fruits of 
economic development. Consequently, the social 
mobilization and mobility which accompanied 
the postwar boom were not able to offset the 
backwardness of some political structures. 
4. The exclusive nature 
of development 
As a result of this, despite their economic 
dynamism the countries of the subregion were 
not capable, during the 30 years after the war, of 
significantly improving income distribution or 
of reducing the number of Central Americans 
living in a state of extreme poverty. According to 
household surveys carried out in recent years, 
towards 1980 for example the poorest 20% of 
the population shared less than 4% of the 
national income, while at the other extreme the 
richest 20% of the population shared more than 
55%. There were considerable differences from 
one country to another, the most untypical 
features corresponding once again to Costa Rica 
(see table 4). In countries where surveys were 
carried out at different times, although the 
methodologies used were not always comparable 
the available evidence indicates that the gap 
between the groups at the two extremes of the 
scale widened, even though the relative share of 
the intermediate strata may have tended to 
increase (see table 5). In the case of Guatemala 
and Costa Rica, the per capita real income of the 
poorest 20% of the population actually went 
down. In addition, as is pointed out below, there 
is evidence that further deterioration occurred in 
the distributive structure between 1980 and 
1984, as a result of increasing levels of 
unemployment and declines in the value of real 
wages. 
In absolute figures, out of a total of over 20 
million Central Americans in 1980, some 13.2 
million (64%) were living in a state of poverty 
—in the sense that their income did not cover 
their basic needs— while over 8.5 million (41 % ) 
did not even have sufficient income to cover the 
value of the minimum shopping basket of food 
considered necessary in order to meet their 
biological nutritional needs (see tableó). The 
situation was much more serious in rural areas 
than in urban ones, though there were 
considerable differences from one country to 
another (in Costa Rica, less than 25% of the 
population lived in poverty, whereas in 
Guatemala the proportion was over 70%). 
Moreover, although it is very likely that the 
percentage of Central Americans living a state of 
poverty nowadays is less than it was 30 years ago, 
it is nevertheless true that in absolute terms, 
because of population expansion, there are now 
more poor people (and also more people who 
Table 4 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data provided by countries. 
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Table 5 
CENTRAL AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF FAMILY INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data provided by countries. 
" Urban sector. 
are not poor) than in the period immediately 
after the Second World War. 
In short, the characteristic style of 
development of the region has been 
concentrative, or at any rate of an exclusive 
nature in the sense that it has favoured the 
different strata of the population in a flagrantly 
inequitable manner, accentuating the degree of 
income concentration in some countries. 
Likewise, although 30 years of rapid and 
sustained economic expansion have gone by, 
over half the inhabitants of Central America 
—and three-quarters of those living in rural 
areas— do not have sufficient income to cover 
their essential needs as regards food, housing, 
clothing and basic services. 
It should be noted that the exclusive pattern 
of development is not limited to the economic 
and social sphere. If it were possible to speak of a 
truly typical characteristic of the type of political 
interaction prevailing in most of the Central 
American countries, then this characteristic 
would be the absence of broad popular 
participation, reflected in the virtual exclusion of 
the masses (and especially the rural masses) 
from political activity. Nei ther the 
industrialization nor the urbanization which 
have taken place since the end of the war have 
been able to bring about a decisive change in the 
still essentially agricultural nature of these 
societies. With a few exceptions, the masses 
working in rural areas continue to be passive 
observers instead of organized actors in the 
evolution of the political systems. This exclusive 
feature has had a decisive influence both on the 
characteristics and the scope of various 
modernization projects attempted in the 
subregion. 
Thus, with a few exceptions, the lack of 
effective participation on the part of the 
emerging sociaf classes has meant that they have 
not been in a position to counterbalance the 
weight of the traditional élites in the handling of 
public affairs, and this has sometimes further 
increased the tensions between the rapid social 
development and the slow institutional 
development in the political sphere. To put this 
in another way, the gap between the 
transformation which has taken place and the 
reinforcing of the political practices and 
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Table 6 
CENTRAL AMERICA: ESTIMATED INCIDENCE OF POVERTY TOWARDS 1980 
Total 
In a state of poverty 
Extreme poverty 
Basic needs not satis iied 
Not in a state of poverty 
Whole of Central ~ 







Urban Rural Total 
Thousands of persons 
8 315 12 381 2 213 
3 738 9 440 549 
2 130 6 517 300 
1 608 2 923 249 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the countries and CELADE (1981). 
"Urban/rural population breakdown corresponds to figures from the 1979/1980 family income and expenditure survey. 
6Urban/rural population breakdown corresponds to figures from the 1978/1979 family income and expenditure survey. 
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institutions of a more complex society has 
contributed to the underlying instability of 
Central America. 
To sum up, except in the case of Costa Rica 
the political interaction in Central America has 
generally been of an elitist nature and it has not 
been able to bring the most numerous 
population groups of the subregion into the 
project for the modernization of its societies. 
As already noted, Central America is 
experiencing a crisis of unprecedented depth and 
proportions. Economic activity has fallen off, 
considerable external imbalances exist as well as 
imbalances in the public sector, levels of saving 
and investment have slumped and there is 
increasingly less margin of action to overcome 
these imbalances and direct economic policy. 
It may be assumed, in view of the 
increasingly high levels of open unemployment 
and underemployment, that the historical 
inequalities in Central American economies are 
becoming even more pronounced. The length of 
the depression and the limited capacity of some 
countries to contract external debt have made it 
necessary to adopt readjustment programmes 
—some of them within the framework of 
commitments with the International Monetary 
Fund— involving the adoption of unpopular 
economic policies. 
Moreover, the aforementioned political 
upheavals affecting the region are closely linked 
with the economic phenomena described above, 
and perhaps all this means that there will be a 
breakdown in the "superimposed development" 
without there being any indication as yet of the 
likely characteristics of an alternative type of 
development. Moreover, the far from 
encouraging economic prospects already 
described hinder the social changes without 
Doing so would have meant perhaps the 
elimination, although possibly only gradually, of 
the factors of authoritarianism already referred 
to, and it would have been necessary to 
undertake the consistently postponed reforms 
aimed at fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of 
the groups which have so far been virtually 
excluded from the benefits of development. 
which the political stability of a number of 
countries in the region is in jeopardy. 
The depth of the crisis has generated a 
s e e m i n g l y i n s u p e r a b l e c l i m a t e o f 
demoralization. Awareness of the fact that many 
problems surpass the capacity of action of the 
constituted governments has given rise to 
uncertainty and even confusion, and the very 
foundations of the process of Central American 
integration are being worn away. 
1. The break with historical trends 
In 1977-1978 the trends briefly described above 
reached a turning point, at least as regards 
sustained economic growth. Since that two-year 
period, a progressive slowdown has occurred 
which finally led to negative rates in most 
countries in 1981 and 1983 and in all of them in 
1982 (see figurei and table 1). The duration, 
intensity and peculiar characteristics of this 
situation have no precedent in the period since 
the war. Suffice it to say that, after 30 years of 
expansion of the five countries' per capita 
income (with only sporadic interruptions), there 
has been a sharp and generalized fall during the 
last five years. Although the shrinkage recorded 
in the economies in the preceding years came to 
an end in 1984 (with the exception of 
II 
Recent events and the current 
economic crisis 
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Nicaragua), in the case of most countries the 
outlook could in no way be described as one of 
reactivation. Thus, real per capita income at the 
end of 1984 in Costa Rica and Guatemala was 
barely equal to the 1972 figure; in Honduras it 
was equal to that for 1970, and in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua —where the situation was even more 
dramatic— it was similar to that of I960 and 
1965 respectively. It should be pointed out that 
the overall deterioration in the material 
standard of living is reflected not only by these 
figures but also by less tangible indicators, such 
as social harmony, personal security and the 
quality of life of the Central American 
population. 
In addition, the process of economic 
integration, which had earlier allowed the 
downward fluctuations in the international 
economy to be offset, underwent a complete 
turnaround and became a factor which 
magnified the crisis. Due to the depth of the 
crisis —together with the prevailing political 
conditions and the lack of a strategy of 
s u b r e g i o n a l scope— the economic 
interdependence of the five countries has tended 
to become a mechanism which transmits 
recessionary economic forces. 
The fact that the pronounced deterioration 
in the evolution of the economies has coincided 
with a period of increasing political upheaval 
may be functionally related to some of the 
characteristics of Central American societies 
which were mentioned previously. One of the 
many manifestations of those characteristics has 
led to a questioning of the social order, involving 
violent challenges to the status quo, and these, in 
turn, have given rise to violent responses which 
have contributed to a rapid polarization of 
positions in some countries, especially El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. There are many 
complex and mutua l ly r e in fo rc ing 
interrelationships among the local political and 
economic factors and the way in which both 
intermix with external influences. 
2. The impact of exogenous 
phenomena 
It is no coincidence that the economic crisis has 
affected all of the countries, regardless of the 
level of social peace or upheaval prevailing in 
them, the economic policy objectives pursued or 
the different relations between the public and 
private sectors. All have been seriously affected 
by factors of external origin. This has been 
inevitable, because the common denominator 
affecting all the countries has been the deep 
recession in the international economy, which, 
as already noted, to a great extent determines the 
overall behaviour of the Central American 
economies and even imposes a limit upon their 
ability to grow. Now, the economic effect of the 
political crisis —discouragement of private 
investment, flight of capital, difficulties in 
attracting external financing— has been added 
to the effect of the world recession, and these 
have combined and reinforced one another to 
the point where they have produced an economic 
breakdown unlike any seen in Central America 
since the 1930s. 
With respect to the effects of the disarray in 
the international economy, it may be recalled 
that, in addition to the industrialized countries' 
difficulties in 1978-1979 —low growth rates, 
high rates of inflation, decreased savings, lags in 
the application of technological innovations— 
there was also a further increase in hydrocarbon 
prices in 1979. Even more importance should 
perhaps be attached to the attempts to modify 
economic policy made by some industrialized 
countries which have stressed the fight against 
inflation —with some success— and have 
resorted, inter alia, to restrictive monetary 
measures that have resulted in high interest 
rates. These policies have undoubtedly 
contributed to the slowdown of economic 
activity in the countries where they have been 
implemented, as well as in the world economy in 
general, with the resulting impact on the levels 
of international trade. This situation has 
weakened the demand for the Central American 
countries' traditional exports. Given the 
persistent international inflation (although 
since 1982 it has begun to decline), this weakness 
of demand has produced a marked deterioration 
in the terms of trade. An additional factor is that, 
in the financial sphere, the Central American 
countries have been affected by the high interest 
rates on their massive foreign debt and by their 
recent difficulties in gaining access to new 
external financing. 
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Table 7 
CENTRAL AMERICA: MAIN FOREING TRADE INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures in tables 7 and 8 speak for 
themselves. With the decline in the prices of 
virtually all the products exported by Central 
America and the continued upward pressure on 
the prices of imports (especially hydrocarbons in 
1979-1980),5 by the end of 1984 the subregion's 
terms of trade had deteriorated by almost 50% 
since 1977, while the purchasing power of its 
exports had fallen by 30%. In general terms, the 
foregoing means that if the 1977 purchasing 
power of exports had been sustained, the total 
value of exports in 1984 would have been 40% 
greater than it actually was, which would have 
added approximately 2.0% to the gross domestic 
product in the latter year. 
Between 1978 and 1983, the terms of trade 
in goods have gone down in all of the countries, 
'For the subregion as a whole, the relative share of petroleum 
in total imports rose from 4.4% in 1970 to 10.7% in 1976,18.7% 
in 1980 and 21.6% in 1981 before falling to 16.1% in 1984. 
while the slight revival which occurred in 1984 
(3.8%) proved insufficient to reverse the decline 
which had taken place over the previous six 
years. In addition, there was a decline in the 
export volumes of some countries (and even the 
complete disappearance of some export 
products, such as nickel in Guatemala, which 
ceased to be exported because of lack of demand), 
as well as increasing difficulties in incorporating 
new lines of products into external sales, due to 
the market restrictions and protectionist 
measures which some industrialized countries 
have put into effect, and a considerable decrease 
in the exportation of some services such as 
tourism, due not only to the world economic 
recession, but also to non-economic factors in 
Central America. 
On the other hand, productive activity in the 
Central American countries required imports, in 
spite of the recession, especially in order to meet 
the demand created by the increased public 
spending which was promoted by the 
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Table 8 







































































Source; ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Table 9 
CENTRAL AMERICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS TRADE DEFICIT IN MILUONS 
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Source; ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
Note; Minus sign equals surplus. 
"Preliminary figures. 
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governments during the first year of the 
recession, partly in order to counteract the 
sluggishness of private investment. As a result, 
the trade deficit of the five countries went from 
US$ 432 million in 1977 (equal to 2% of GDP) to 
nearly VS$ 1.6 billion in 1981 (8.7% of GDP), 
subsequently stabilizing at around US$ 1 billion 
per year between 1982 and 1984 (5.4% of GDP in" 
this latter year, albeit with considerable 
differences from one country to another) (see 
table 9). There was also a spectacular increase in 
debt servicing, attributable not only to increased 
borrowing but also —at least until mid-1984— 
to soaring interest rates. External factor 
payments for the subregion as a whole rose, for 
example, from US$ 280 million in 1977 to 
US$ 980 million in 1984. This explains why the 
current account deficit grew from US$ 573 
million to more than US$ 1.8 billion during the 
same period (3.8% and 9-3% of GDP 
respectively) (see table 10). 
During 1979-1980, Central America had 
considerable access to public and especially 
private international financing. The external 
support for Nicaragua's reconstruction 
programmes contributed significantly to this 
phenomenon, and these resources partially 
replaced internal savings, which tended to 
disappear rapidly due to public sector deficits 
and the flight of private capital. In 1977 only 
12.6% of total savings came from external 
sources, but that figure had increased to 38.8% 
by 1981 and remained in excess of 35% in 1984 
(see table 11). During the same period, the 
subregion's external public debt rose from 
US$ 2.4 billion to slightly less than US$ 15 
billion, and limitations on several countries' 
capacity for additional borrowing became 
evident. 
This last circumstance, combined with the 
constraints on the availability of new resources 
(the commercial banking system considers the 
Table 10 
CENTRAL AMERICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT 

















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data, 
Note: Minus sign equals surplus. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 11 
CENTRAL AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF INVESTMENT A N D SAVING 
(Millions of constant 1970 dollars) 
Central A merica 
Gross domestic product 
Gross domestic investment 
Domestic saving 
External saving 
External saving/total saving 
Costa Rica 
Gross domestic product6 
Gross domestic investment 
Domestic saving 
External saving 
External saving/total saving 
El Salvador 
Gross domestic product6 
Gross domestic investment 
Domestic saving 
External saving 
External saving/total saving 
Guate?nala 
Gross domestic product 
Gross domestic investment 
Domestic saving 
External saving 
External saving/total saving 
Honduras 
Gross domestic product 
Gross domestic investment 
Domestic saving 
External saving 
External saving/total saving 
Nicaragua 
Gross domestic product' ' 
Gross domestic investment 
Domestic saving 
External saving 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
At market prices. 
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subregion to be of high financial and political 
risk, while official sources have tended to 
diminish due to the austerity policies of the 
donor countries), has created serious difficulties 
since 1981 in obtaining net financing, and in 
1982 external savings —far from offsetting the 
drop in national savings— showed the same 
downward trend. 
It should be mentioned that the majority of 
the countries' balance of payments have 
recorded increases in net capital inflows since 
1981, particularly in 1983 when these came to 
almost \JS$ 2 billion. Approximately half such 
income did not represent injections of currency, 
however: it was the result of renegotiations of 
payments due on the existing external debt, 
particularly in Costa Rica and Nicaragua (ECLAC, 
1985). 
Moreover, those countries which obtained 
access to a greater flow of official funding, 
particularly of a bilateral nature (Costa Rica, El 
Salvador and, to a lesser extent, Honduras), have 
had to accept increasingly strict conditionality, 
basically with regard to economic policy, but on 
some occasions even affecting other aspects of 
national activity too. During 1984 the 
International Monetary Fund, which is 
supporting readjustment programmes in three 
countries, ceased its disbursements to two of 
them (Guatemala and Honduras) because they . 
had failed to meet the quantitative goals set, 
while in the case of the third country (Costa 
Rica) no final agreement had yet been reached at 
the time of writing (March 1985) on the renewal 
of the programme which had come to an end in 
December 1984. 
Finally, a further phenomenon of 
considerable importance which made itself 
sharply felt during this period was the intense 
and persistent flight of capital throughout the 
subregion (in some countries more than in 
others) due to economic and especially non-
economic factors. The identifiable deposits of 
Central American citizens in United States 
banks alone (excluding their branches in the 
Bahamas, Panama and other banking havens), 
grew by more than US$ 1.4 billion between mid-
1979 and 1984. The breakdown by countries is 
given in table 12. 
It should be noted that the fluctuation in the 
size of these deposits provides a rough indicator 
of the scale of capital flight in the five countries 
mentioned. On the one hand, part of the increase 
represents the reinvestment of interest earned 
by these same deposits. On the other, this figure 
naturally fails to include investments made by 
Central Americans during the last five-year 
period in real estate and securities in the United 
States, or any other type of investment made in 
other countries open to capital. 
At a rough estimate, between 1979 and 1984 
this flight represented between US$ 2 billion 
and US$ 2.5 billion for the five countries in the 
region. Naturally, this worsened each country's 
external position, and had a decisive influence in 
the slump in economic activity. Paradoxically, 
the exhaustion of the countries' international 
monetary reserves at the beginning of the 
recessionary period and the high level of 
external indebtedness recorded facilitated this 
capital flight. 
Table 12 
CENTRAL AMERICA: DEPOSITS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN CITIZENS IN 
THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
























Source: Federal Reserve System (1979 and 1984) and Treasury Department (1980 and 1984). 
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Furthermore, exogenous factors not only 
had an impact on the evolution of the economies, 
but also influenced political events. Towards the 
end of the 1970s significant changes occurred in 
the political interaction of the subregion, 
especially in Nicaragua. Just as the long period of 
postwar economic expansion had reached a 
turning point, the social and political structures 
too had to undergo a major shift. These events 
gave rise to a heterogeneous alliance which 
challenged the ruling régime in Nicaragua. It 
was no accident, however, that the changes in 
Nicaragua —like those in Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Honduras in the 1940s—coincided 
with a United States foreign policy aimed at 
promoting orderly change based on principles 
prized by the latter country. Thus, during a brief 
interlude the geopolitical boundaries referred to 
earlier were extended, and the challenge 
launched in one of the countries against the 
traditional development model became viable. 
3. The challenge to the 
"superimposed development" model 
The programme adopted by the Government of 
National Reconstruction of Nicaragua departs 
from the traditional norms. In a different 
context, the events in El Salvador also deviate 
from the model of " supe r imposed 
development", since they have given rise to 
changes which, in one form or another, alter the 
pre-existing structures. It could even be said that, 
under the twofold onslaught of the economic 
crisis and the threat to the status quo, it is 
unlikely that the pre-existing structures in some 
countries will be able to survive without 
fundamental adjustments. This in no way 
predetermines the nature of the social 
organizations which might eventually replace 
the preceding ones, nor their ideological 
leanings; ¡t only means that the postwar model 
which has been in effect for more than 30 years 
may have run its course. 
Some of the economic phenomena which are 
the subject and object of the crisis clearly 
illustrate the above. One such phenomenon is 
capital accumulation. Investment has been 
shrinking markedly since 1978 both as a result 
and as a cause of the contraction in economic 
activity, the drop in domestic savings, the flight 
of capital and the reaction of the private sector to 
the political and social tensions affecting the 
subregion. Table 11 shows that the domestic 
savings of the five countries fell from 19.2% to 
9.7% of the gross domestic product between 
1977 and 1984: a serious situation for countries 
which are attempting to develop. Private 
investment also suffered a marked setback, and it 
diminished in all of the countries. The 
subregional coefficient of private investment fell 
from 13-4% in 1977 to less than 8% in 1984, 
while in the countries experiencing civil unrest, 
the coefficient of private capital formation has 
fallen by more than 50% in the last seven years. 
The public sector made an effort to counteract 
this decrease (thereby accentuating another 
long-standing imbalance in the Central 
American economies: the public finance deficit) 
but it was not enough; the coefficient of total 
investment declined in all the countries and 
tended to create bottlenecks in areas where 
public spending cannot substitute for private 
investment. 
The deliberate efforts made by governments 
to counteract the reduction in economic activity, 
at a time when there was a downward trend in 
tax revenues, caused the portion of the 
subregional GDP represented by public spending 
to increase from 17.7% in 1977 to 21.3% in 
1981, while the taxation rate decreased from 
12.9% to 11.6% during the same period. As a 
result of the asymmetry in the patterns of 
expenditure and income, the aggregate deficit of 
the five governments rose from 460 million 
Central American pesos in 1977 (3% of GDP) to 
approximately 1.6 billion in 1984 (8.0% of GDP) 
(see table 13). Since there was not enough 
external financing to cover the deficits, domestic 
financing was used, but this expedient indirectly 
exacerbated the disequilibrium in the balance of 
payments —through the imported component 
of expenditure— and in some cases absorbed 
most of the expansion in domestic credit, 
thereby taking away resources from the private 
national sectors. Thus, forces came into play 
which are tending to destroy, or already have 
destroyed, the traditional stability of prices and 
exchange rates in the countries of the subregion. 
This is another manifestation of the gradual 
functional impoverishment of the pre-existing 
structures. 
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Table 13 
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Source; ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
Note: Minus sign equals surplus. 
"Preliminary figures. 
4. The consequences for intra-Central 
American co-operation 
The constraints of the external sector —re-
flected in the shortage of foreign exchange— 
have worsened to such an extent that, as from 
1981, the countries with deficits in intra-
regional trade have even had difficulties in 
covering their debit balances. Initially, the 
central banks of the surplus countries extended 
bilateral lines of credit, and later a subregional 
mechanism was established to deal with the 
same problem multilateraly (the Central 
American Common Market Fund). However, 
when these avenues were exhausted6 —and 
6
 At the end of December 1984, the bilateral debts contracted 
by the countries in order to keep up their trade in previous years 
came to over US$ 380 million, a debt so large that it exhausted the 
financing capacity both of the countries enjoying a surplus in this 
trade and of the multilateral mechanisms mentioned. See the 
periodic reports of the Central American Clearing House. 
when sufficient backing from the international 
community was not forthcoming— the lack of 
foreign exchange began to limit intra-Central 
American trade. 
The response of some countries to the 
constraints on their external sector was to adopt 
exchange measures (variations in parity, 
adoption of multiple rates or of controls on the 
movement of foreign exchange) which affected 
the terms of trade at the inter-Central American 
level and in some cases limited the volume of 
commercial transactions. As a result of all these 
phenomena, intra-regional trade ceased to play 
its traditional role as a factor capable of 
offsetting cyclical lows in extra-regional trade 
and became one more victim of the crisis in the 
external sector. Thus, the value of this trade has 
declined systematically —from 1.13 billion 
Central American pesos in 1980 to 742 million 
in 1984— and its relative share of the 
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subregion's total exports shrank from 23.1% to 
18.5% in the same period (see table 14). 
One of this situation's innumerable effects 
on the productive apparatus was that the degree 
of industrialization —which, as already noted, 
had increased consistently between 1950 and 
1978— stagnated, diminishing from 17.1% in 
1978 to 16.2% in 1982 and 16% in 1984. In 
other words, after its expansion had been more 
dynamic than that of the economy as a whole 
during the boom, industrialization performed 
even less dynamically than the economy as a 
whole during the recession. 
Despite the fact that the Central American 
governments have traditionally been, and 
continue to be, successful in keeping the sphere 
of economic co-operation separate from the 
sphere of political relations, the growing 
ideological heterogeneity now poses a latent 
threat that political differences will overflow 
into the sphere of economic co-operation 
precisely at the time when intra-regional co-
operation is most needed in order to mitigate the 
effects of the external sector problems. In 
addition, the danger of internationalization of 
intra-regional conflicts could lead to a greater 
fragmentation of Central America and a 
repetition of painful historical episodes. 
Table 14 
CENTRAL AMERICA: TOTAL VALUE OF INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE AND RELATIVE 
SHARE IN TOTAL EXPORTS 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984" 
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III 
Short-term prospects 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the 
majority of Central American countries have 
been suffering for five or six years in succession 
from negative rates of growth and pronounced 
imbalances both in the external sector and in 
public finances. Almost all of them undertook 
adjustment programmes towards 1981, once 
their international monetary reserves had been 
exhausted. These policies have been applied 
with varying intensity and in different fashion 
from one country to another. Generally 
speaking, imports fell off sharply —in some 
cases as a result of exchange adjustments, in 
others simply as a reflection of quantitative 
restrictions and depressed demand— public 
expenditure fell off, and restrictive credit 
policies were applied together with tight wages 
policies. In a number of cases, tax procurement 
also increased and payments due on the external 
debt were restructured. Even Nicaragua adopted 
a set of measures after 1984 —belatedly and 
without Internat ional Monetary Fund 
approval— which pursued the same aims. 
Nevertheless, in 1984, two or more years 
since the adjustments were undertaken, the 
outlook remains unpromising. In four out of the 
five economies the per capita gross domestic 
product has recorded continual declines, and in 
all of them (albeit to differing extents) domestic 
and external financial imbalances continued to 
be recorded (in the case of two countries the IMF 
even interrupted disbursements of the stand-by 
credits which had been granted, as the countries 
had failed to comply with the programmes 
agreed upon). 
At the beginning of 1985, then, what is the 
likelihood of the subregion's economies 
adjusting to the new international circumstances 
and succeeding in constructing a new platform 
for reactivating production? 
1. Externa/ and domestic constraints 
As 1985 began, the future of the Central 
American economies was fraught with 
uncertainty. The brisk revival which had taken 
place in the United States economy during the 
previous two years had not as yet been 
transmitted with similar intensity to the 
remaining industrialized countries, and even less 
so to the developing countries, especially the 
small agricultural export economies such as 
those of Centrai America. Doubt was also 
harboured as to whether the revival would prove 
lasting. 
These phenomena could not fail to have a 
powerful influence on the evolution and features 
of the Central American countries' external 
trade. During 1983 and 1984, despite the 
recovery in the United States, no significant 
improvement occurred in the region's terms of 
trade. This is an exception to historical 
experience, as generally the prices of 
commodities have risen during the upward 
phase of international economic cycles. 
These phenomena may be linked to the 
transformations which have taken place in the 
international economy. New technologies 
— p a r t i c u l a r l y the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
microelectronics and biogenetics, together with 
the introduction of new materials (fibre optics 
and high-temperature ceramics and plastics) — 
alter comparative advantages throughout the 
world, transform trade flows and probably have 
an adverse impact upon small agricultural 
export economies, such as those of Central 
America. One illustration of this is the reversal 
which has occurred in the redeployment of the 
textiles industry from the developed countries 
towards the Third World, which may be 
attributed to technological innovations in the 
automation of manufacturing processes. This 
phenomenon is in addition to the well known 
income-inelasticity of the demand on 
international markets for the commodities 
exported by Central America. In addition, the 
overvaluation of the dollar, in which the prices 
of the commodities exported by Central America 
are quoted, further aggravated this trend. 
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The uncertainty affecting the subregion's 
external trade is also reflected in the financial 
sphere. It would seem likely that in the 
foreseeable future the capital accounts of Central 
America's balances of payment will display quite 
different features from those recorded in 
previous decades. Firstly, there is little likelihood 
of net external funds of similar size to those of 
the 1970s being mustered. On the one hand, 
international private banks appear to be 
extremely reluctant to commit fresh funds in a 
subregion in which high risks are considered to 
prevail; on the other hand, commitments 
originating from external debt servicing are so 
high that the possibility of the region becoming 
a net exporter of capital cannot be discounted.7 
Secondly, even if the countries of the 
subregion obtain access to increased external 
public financing, the funds would probably be 
subject to even stricter conditions, with a 
consequent impact both on economic policy and 
other policy areas outside the economic sphere. 
This circumstance represents a far clearer trade-
off in the application of economic policy than 
has hitherto been the case: the cost of 
formulating a reactivation policy without having 
access to sufficient external funds, as against the 
possible costs —naturally of another kind— of 
obtaining such funds, but on such terms that the 
vulnerability of the economies would be 
maintained and perhaps even increased. 
Finally, the majority of countries are facing 
an equally unprecedented problem regarding the 
restructuring of commitments deriving from the 
external debt. The conditions on which 
agreement is reached with regard to servicing 
the debt will be one of the factors determining 
the capacity of the Central American economies 
to import and consequently to grow. Here again, 
it is hard to make any predictions in this respect. 
Uncertainty over factors of domestic origin 
comes on top of the unsettled trends in the 
international economy. Perhaps the most 
'This phenomenon is aggravated by the fact that as a result of 
the application of various mechanisms which vary from one 
country to the next (stabilization bonds, guarantee funds, 
underwriting of loans) the public sector has virtually taken over 
the risk for the external private debt, and consequently, ¡none way 
or another, governments have assumed responsibility for servicing 
the total external debt. 
significant of these factors are the social and 
political conflicts taking place in the subregion. 
It would be Utopian to consider reactivating the 
economies on the basis of a revival of domestic 
savings and investment —which are in 
themselves inadequate— without having 
succeeded in correcting the prevailing climate of 
political instability. This in turn requires 
changes in the patterns of political interaction in 
most Central America countries. 
Consequently, as long as ideological 
polarization persists and spills over into violent 
conflict, and as long as no success is achieved in 
integrating and improving the participation of 
the various sectors of the population in political 
activity, there is little likelihood of a return to the 
social harmony which, today more than ever, is a 
pre-requisite for achieving targets of material 
well-being. Unless this is achieved, the flight of 
private capital will continue together with the 
erosion of the capital stock, thereby threatening 
the continuity of domestic mechanisms for 
generating savings and investments. 
In such circumstances, neither is it feasible to 
envisage a simple process allowing for concerted 
support for the policy of economic reactivation. 
The present climate of ideological and 
conceptual polarization, together with the 
widespread tendency to resort to violence in 
order to settle conflicts in a number of countries, 
and the increased intensity of struggles for a 
share in the declining profits furnished by the 
economies, make it singularly difficult to achieve 
even minimum consensuses on any 
development project. Moreover, the tensions 
described above have led to a considerable 
diversion of resources towards expenditure on 
defence and security at a time when the 
subregion's governments should utilize a 
maximum of their meagre resources in 
protecting their populations' standards of living. 
In this respect, domestic friction as well as 
dissension between countries hamper economic 
revival and prevent any improvement in the 
climate for intra-regional co-operation. 
To sum up, it is difficult to make any forecast 
as to the likely evolution of the Central 
American economies. On the one hand, the 
exhaustion of their international monetary 
reserves, the burden of the external debt, the 
shrinkage in imports and the depressed levels of 
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all macroeconomic variables (consumption, 
savings, investment, employment) considerably 
narrow the margin of action available to 
economic policy; on the other hand, the 
restrictions of external and subregional origin 
affecting Central American development are 
subject to a whole range of factors which further 
heighten the uncertainty looming over all the 
countries. Thus, the domestic and external 
economic and non-economic circumstances 
which determined the evolution of Central 
American economies and societies during the $0 
years after the Second World War have 
undergone a change, and this will undoubtedly 
call for different responses from those adopted 
in the past if the subregion is to overcome the 
obstacles which nowadays virtually cancel out 
any possibility of expansion and transformation 
of its economies. 
2. The growing conceptual polarization 
One of the many consequences of the 
international economic crisis has been the 
collapse of historical paradigms. Thus, just as 
doubt is being cast on the Keynesian theses 
which dominated governmental action in the 
industrialized countries for more than 30 years, 
the outmoded methods used to stimulate the 
development of the Third World economies are 
also being questioned. A major debate is 
underway over the supposed decadence of the 
"discipline" of development. It is asserted by 
some that developmentalist patterns —which 
would appear to include the "idées-force" 
repeatedly set out by the Secretariat of ECLAC— 
have proved ineffective, and consequently a 
variety of credos of either neoclassical or Marxist 
bent are being put forward (Hirschman, 1981, 
pp. 5 to 19). With regard to Central America, the 
debate follows lines parallel to the already 
mentioned ideological polarization. 
Moreover, in a number of industrialized 
economies, and particularly in the United States 
of America, there has occurred what some see as 
a reaction to the excesses committed since the 
1930s with regard to welfare policy, the 
expansion of public services, the rise in tax 
coefficients and increasing regulation of a 
variety of private activities (Gilder, 1981 and 
Murray, 1984). This growing conservatism in 
the sphere of economic policy advocates the 
reduction of the State's role (which, among other 
things, leads to a lower tax burden and a 
shrinkage of public services); increased reliance 
upon the market in resource allocation; the 
encouragement of saving and private 
investment, together with the elimination or at 
least the reduction of controls and regulations. In 
the cultural and civic spheres policies which 
make an appeal to traditional values are being 
advocated (Kristoal, 1978 and Podhoretz, 1980). 
Naturally, this set of ideas has found supporters 
and imitators in other parts of the world, 
including of course the countries of Central 
America. 
These two phenomena —the collapse of 
established paradigms as a result of the 
economic crisis and the gradual rise of the 
attitudes towards social and economic 
organization prevailing within some advanced 
societies— point to a clear conceptual 
polarization over the way in which the process of 
economic development should be handled. Not 
only does this produce new cleavages between 
the various social groups, but it has also led to a 
number of international financial bodies —both-
multilateral and bilateral— taking part in the 
debate and recently propagating in Central 
America variations of the fashionable theory as 
to how to adjust and reactivate the economies. 
The conjunction of these phenomena has 
given rise to two opposing strategies for 
bringing about reactivation. The first of these 
proposes "opening up" the Central American 
economies to international trade and financial 
flows and adopting a set of macroeconomic 
policies designed to give the productive 
apparatus an export-oriented bias, in order that 
the market forces may direct it towards increased 
insertion into the international economy, on the 
basis of the comparative advantages possessed 
by the region. This "opening up" would ideally 
go hand in hand with the encouragement of 
private investment as well as, on occasion, a 
reduction in the role of the public sector, 
especially with a view to eliminating obstacles to 
the market signals. The advocates of this 
approach claim that the recovery of the 
industrialized economies would spread 
vigorously to the Central American economies 
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through the many linkages which would be 
established. 
Advocates of the opposing view are to be 
found among those who, after having observed 
the magnitude of the adverse factors in the 
Central American external sector during recent 
years, propose that the subregion's economies 
should be further isolated from the vicissitudes 
of the international economy, and that the State 
should play a greater role to counterbalance the 
performance of the private sector and offset the 
recessionary impact of the depression. 
To sum up, what is taking place is the age-
old debate, but under new circumstances, with 
perhaps more extreme and doctrinaire 
approaches than in the past. These 
circumstances further worsen the climate of 
uncertainty so often mentioned. 
3. Alternative prospects 
Forecasts as to the likely evolution of the Central 
American economies depend at least partly upon 
the stance adopted by the author. In the view of 
some authors, the logical outcome of advocating 
the unrestricted operation of market 
mechanisms in resource allocation, of reducing 
the various ways in which the State plays a 
guiding role, of encouraging both national and 
internat ional private investment and 
eliminating any barriers to such investments, 
would be for the Central American economies to 
be pulled along by the renewed expansion of the 
international economy —mainly under the pull 
of the developed economies and in particular 
that of the United States of America— towards a 
new era of prosperity, founded this time on 
advanced technology and a number of tertiary 
activities. In other words, the same reasoning 
that would bring about the reactivation of the 
central economies would cause its dynamizing 
impact to spill over into the peripheral 
economies, through a new worldwide scheme of 
comparative advantages (Nau, 1984-1985). Of 
course, it is acknowledged that there are 
obstacles which might mean that not all 
countries could reap maximum benefits from 
this momentum (for example, the high level of 
external indebtedness of some countries), but it 
is claimed that it is possible to lower and 
overcome these hurdless by means of timely 
negotiations and the application of suitable 
policies. 
A different forecast would involve 
recognizing the possibility that the recent 
expansion in the economies of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operaton and Development 
(OECD) might fail to maintain itself,8 or that its 
dynamic impact might not necessarily be felt in 
the peripheral economies. At least as far as 
Central America is concerned, there are factors 
of domestic origin which decidedly upset the free 
operation of the market mechanisms. The 
dynamizing effects traditionally associated with 
economic integration have gradually dwindled 
away in recent years as a result of the very depth 
of the crisis. It follows that in view of the 
uncertain outlook for the region, it would be 
realistic to assume that the period necessary for 
the Central American economies and societies to 
adjust to the new circumstances —in the 
external and regional environment as well as 
within each country— might be quite long. 
Indeed, if it turned out that the international 
economic crisis was merely a depressive cycle 
—albeit the deepest since the war— the positive 
impact, as already noted in Central America in 
1984, would be extremely limited during the 
next two years, in view of the heavy burden of 
external indebtedness, the exhaustion of 
international monetary reserves and the major 
upsets which the recession has caused to the 
subregion's productive capacity and social 
structure. 
The vital need to undertake structural 
transformations in order to adapt to a changing 
international economy will necessarily take a 
long time. In recent years the Central American 
countries have realized that the development of 
new export activities cannot be achieved either 
by decree or instantaneously: it requires changes 
of attitude on the part of entrepreneurs and 
workers, trial periods which may occasionally be 
long, changes in methods of production and 
marketing, and lengthy periods before new 
investment bears its fruit. Even if an economic 
strategy with a smaller element of self-
8Nau (1984-1985) indicates that, if the United States fiscal 
deficit is not brought down, that country's economy will shortly 
enter a new recessionary cycle, caused by high interest rates and the 
shrinkage of private investment. 
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determination were chosen, it would also require 
a long period before making itself felt. The need 
to simultaneously address the whole set of 
problems facing the region —moving forward in 
the painful but unavoidable task of adjustment, 
restoring acceptable levels of saving and 
investment, reactivating production and 
providing even a minimal response to popular 
demands which have long been put off— merely 
serves to complicate the outlook and confirms 
that the task will be a long one. 
It is for this reason that a realistic outlook 
would involve assuming that, in view of the 
magnitude of the problems, the subregion's 
It would be just as absurd to assert that there is 
no way out of the crisis —there is a way out of 
any problem facing human activity— as to 
imagine that there are ready-made or copybook 
solutions at hand for reactivating the economies 
of Central America and setting them on the path 
towards generalized prosperity. Between that 
vision which predicts a permanent depression 
and the other which is Utopian, there is a whole 
range of intermediate situations which could 
gradually pave the way for a policy of 
development. The following pages provide an 
examination of some critical areas for laying 
down those foundations, in the hope of 
stimulating debate on the response to the many 
sided and complex challenge facing Central 
Americans. 
1. Observations on the aims of the 
reactivation and development policy 
It is the Secretariat's view that one of the first 
issues with the Central American governments 
ought to tackle is the set of aims to be pursued in 
a reactivation and development policy. As is well 
known, the conventional aims of development 
economies are likely to stagnate for a fairly long 
period of time, in differing degrees and with ups 
and downs from one year to the next, but 
nonetheless within an overall framework of 
quasi-stagnation. This in no way means that 
countries are condemned to wallow in a 
permanent slump, but it does mean that it will be 
vital to carry out a vigorous policy of reactivation 
and development allowing the Central 
American subregion to reorganize its 
considerable natural and human resources in 
order to lay the foundations for sustained 
development. 
involve growth, improvement of income 
distribution, reduction of the economies' 
vulnerability to external factors, and promotion 
of changes not only in the economic, but also in 
the social and political spheres. It is thus sought 
to establish societies which are more pluralistic, 
participative and democratic. 
It is vital to establish an order of priority 
among these aims, not only because it is doubtful 
whether they can be pursued simultaneously 
—even during periods of prosperity, and even 
more so during times of austerity— but also 
because espousal of one of these objectives in 
preference to the others will determine the 
nature of the set of economic policies to be 
adopted. For example, if a particular 
government resolves to give priority to social 
justice, it could decide to favour particular 
instruments of economic policy (agrarian 
reform, greater expenditure on social services, 
periodic wage adjustments) which could have 
the counterpart effect of discouraginng private 
investment and thwarting the achievement of 
growth. In other words, regardless of the 
neoclassists' conclusion that the aims of 
distribution and growth are compatible (by 
IV 
Bases for a policy of reactivation and 
development 
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means of the proverbial "overspill" of the fruits 
of growth), the experience of Central America, 
and indeed of Latin America as a whole, during 
the three postwar decades indicates that 
considerable trade-offs are involved between the 
various aims of development. There is very little 
empirical proof to support the idea that good 
things come in packets (Packenham, 1973, 
p. 123) or that it is possible to simultaneously 
grow, improve income distribution, acquire 
autonomy and advance towards more democratic 
societies (see Wolfe, 1984). 
Naturally, this does not mean that the oft-
mentioned aims are in no way laudable and 
worth pursuing. Nor is it necessary to pursue 
only one or a few of them at the expense of the 
others. However, it is necessary to clarify the 
relative importance of each of them —and their 
mutual relationship— in the light of the 
programme of reactivation or development 
which the circumstances require. Thus, under 
present circumstances in Central America, some 
governments might single out the target of 
social justice, even if this involved sacrificing 
growth targets; others might seek to maximize 
growth, possibly in an attempt to recover part of 
the ground lost in recent years and to meet the 
need to create jobs for a rapidly-growing 
economically active population. Still others 
might prefer to promote social harmony, 
together with pluralistic and democratic 
institutions. 
All these objectives are worthy in 
themselves. Nevertheless, the diagnosis made in 
the first two sections of this article would seem 
to suggest —at least as a basis for discussion in 
governmental forums in each country as well as 
in intergovernmental ones at the subregional 
level— that under present circumstances, what 
the Central American countries require above 
all, both in the economic and social spheres, is a 
broadening of the extremely narrow leeway 
which is available at the present time for them to 
formulate economic policy and forge their own 
destiny; that is to say, reduction of their external 
vulnerability.9 
''The following ideas are deeply influenced by the 
posthumously published work of Professor Dudley Seers (1983). 
The author makes frequent use of the terms margin of action 
almost as a synonym for acquiring autonomy or lowering external 
vulnerability. 
In the economic field, the practical pursuit of 
this aim would, for example, involve the 
following: seeking relative self-sufficiency with 
regard to food supply, without neglecting 
considerations of efficiency; development by the 
subregion of its own technologies for those 
activities of greatest importance to the Central 
Amer ican economies; diversifying and 
expanding exports; encouraging patterns of 
consumption less dependent on the use of 
imported goods; adoption of less capital- and 
energy-intensive production pat terns; and 
intensive use of labour, the region's most 
plentiful resource. There is not necessarily 
anything novel about these ideas, but they bear a 
new sense of urgency. Outside the purely 
economic field, this aim would be expressed by 
asserting the historical and cultural identity of 
Central Americans and consolidating the 
concept of the nation-State.10 
These concepts need to be carefully defined. 
First and foremost, acquiring greater autonomy 
or reducing external vulnerability should by no 
means be equated with autarky. The small scale 
of the Central American economies, even taken 
as a whole, and their vocation as exporters leave 
no doubt that their behaviour will remain closely 
linked to the performance of the external sector. 
It will be necessary, however, to seek a new, 
dynamic, diversified and selective insertion 
within the international economy, and not 
merely an indiscriminate "opening-up" which 
instead of reducing vulnerability would probably 
tend to increase it. In other words, the aim of 
diversifying and expanding the export sector is 
not to further increase dependence on the 
vicissitudes of the international economy, but 
rather to obtain greater leeway for the external 
relations of the Central American countries. 
Secondly, greater autonomy should not be 
pursued at the expense of the conventional aims 
of development, but rather an effort should be 
made to achieve those other aims through the 
central objective, while attempting to ensure 
"'Seers ( 1983. p. 9} states that this involves promoting the 
supposed interests of a group possessing cultural coherence, which 
displays at least a certain degree of ethnic and linguistic 
homogeneity, and which generally lives within a political unit, or 
nation-State (it may occasionally apply to a group of nation-
States). 
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that they provide mutual support for one 
another. If, in pursuing the central objective of 
increasing the leeway available for economic 
policy, an effort is also made to pursue growth, 
improve distribution and encourage greater 
participation in the societies, it is perfectly 
possible that not all these aims will be optimized 
—it has already been observed that even in the 
best possible circumstances this would be 
impossible—, but neither will they be left aside. 
Thus, attempting to achieve a relatively self-
sufficient food supply would not only help to 
reduce external vulnerability, but would also 
contribute to growth and even to redistribution, 
since food production is largely in the hands of 
small and medium-sized farmers. Likewise, 
stressing the interdependence of the Central 
American economies is not merely a means of 
fulfilling the oft-mentioned central objective; it 
could also appeal to cultural and historical values 
which would facilitate the subsequent 
establishment of the foundations of more 
participative and pluralistic societies. 
Moreover, seeking greater leeway at the 
national level is functionally linked to the socio-
political aims of improving income distribution 
and progressing towards societies with greater 
participation and pluralism. Thus, since 
governments are not only unable to use public 
expenditure as a means of exerting pressure on 
the agents of production, but also face social 
demands which have intensified as a result of the 
global decline in income, they will have to seek 
the consensus needed to obtain increased 
economic autonomy by trying to gain the 
agreement of a variety of social groups and 
incorporating them into de decision-making 
process. Similarly, they will need to set up 
mechanisms for improving social justice, both 
with regard to sharing out the burden of the 
economic recession and distributing the benefits 
of reactivation. The ability to use consensus as a 
course of action varies from one political régime 
to the next, and depends on the institutional 
traditions and structure of each country, but in 
every case there is a real chance that the central 
aim of broadening the margin of action available 
for national policy and the secondary aims of 
seeking greater social justice, consensus and 
participation in the decision-making process 
will provide mutual support for each other. 
There is a social and cultural aspect to the 
heightening of Central American identity, which 
overlaps into the economic and political sphere. 
It is indeed tempting to propose that Central 
American development should be not merely a 
mirror image of an international pattern which 
is probably alien to the region's traditional 
values (and to the resources at its disposal), but 
rather the reflection of its own considerable 
historical and cultural heritage. This could have 
an influence upon the patterns of production and 
consumption, once again as a more autonomous 
attempt to tackle the problems of development. 
Finally, favouring the acquisition of 
autonomy in preference to other aims possesses 
the additional advantage, in the case of Central 
America, of being a target with which all the 
governments of the region, without exception, 
can wholeheartedly identify. In view of the 
increasing diversity of approaches being adopted 
in Central America on the one hand, and the 
clear need for a minimum platform of common 
objectives to facilitate the formulation of joint 
action as part of the effort to achieve intra-
regional co-operation, on the other, it is 
perfectly logical to pursue the common and 
ideologically neutral aim of expanding the 
margin of action. 
To sum up, this objective is capable of 
mobilizing all the Central American 
governments around an "idée-force", around 
which other subsidiary elements of equal 
importance for the revival of the economies, 
such as economic dynamism, social justice, 
participation and democratization, could 
revolve. 
2. Features of the desired 
productive structure 
The first requisite of a policy for reactivation and 
development is a precise definition of sectoral 
and sub-sectoral priorities. In this respect, the 
countries of the region could adopt a pragmatic 
approach designed to make maximum use of the 
possibilities which the international market 
continues to offer, while simultaneously giving a 
determined impetus to efficient import 
substitution. 
Central America possesses a range of 
resources on which to base economic 
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reactivation and long-term development. 
Although the size of the resources has 
occasionally been exaggerated, there is no doubt 
that they are capable of satisfying the basic needs 
of the whole of the population of Central 
America and even providing a fairly comfortable 
standard of living for most of them. However, in 
order to make maximum use of them, major 
investments are required, together with a big 
effort of mobilization and organization. 
Thus, preparation of the labour force to 
adjust it to the changing circumstances of the 
international economy involves a major effort of 
training at all levels. This would involve the 
educational system both in and out of school. 
Moreover, there is no reason why Central 
America should resign itself to exporting five or 
six commodities; in view of its resource 
endowment and its geographical location, 
notwithstanding the uncertain outlook on the 
international market, there are opportunities for 
expanding and diversifying sales of a range of 
agricultural products (including fruit, 
vegetables, meat, fibres, marine products and 
chemical inputs of vegetable origin, all capable 
of undergoing gradually increasing degrees of 
processing). In addition, exploitation of forestry 
resources represents considerable potential in a 
number of countries. In this respect, the 
specialized evolution of the manufacturing 
sector in the northern European countries 
during the present century could provide a 
number of worthwhile lessons, as could the 
progress achieved by a number of Asian 
economies in the export of manufactures 
involving a high labour input. 
It is within these branches of activity, that 
the stimuli for future growth, which could be 
classified into four major categories, are to be 
found. First of all, it is necessary to consolidate 
the know-how which the region already 
possesses: with regard to exports, we must 
strengthen production of traditiorial crops; with 
regard to domestic consumption, that of basic 
foodstuffs. This will require an increase in 
productivity and efficiency, the achievement of a 
better agricultural and ecological balance 
between the various crops and production areas 
and, in the case of a number of products, an 
increase in supply if national economic 
autonomy is to be increased. 
Nevertheless, it would be difficult for the 
subregion to achieve a process of sustained 
expansion upon the basis of past practice. 
Traditional export products are subject to well-
known restrictions in world demand originating 
in the features of the markets for most of them 
(the one exception might be meat); on the 
supply side, the easily expandable agricultural 
frontier has been near its limits since the end of 
the 1960s. This does not mean that a ceiling has 
been reached in the production levels of coffee, 
cotton, sugar cane and bananas, but it does mean 
that any further expansion of this frontier will 
involve increasing marginal costs in the future. 
Secondly, it would be desirable to encourage 
greater selective integration (both backwards 
and forwards) of traditional products, so as to 
increase Central America's share of their added 
value. In spite of the protectionist measures 
adopted in the developed economies, which, for 
example, restrict the access of plain textiles and 
clothing manufactured in Central America to 
their markets, there is still room for increasing 
the degree of processing of a number of 
commodities produced in the region with a 
reasonable degree of efficiency. At the same 
time, Central American entrepreneurs will need 
to take a more active role in marketing their 
products, even to the point of establishing firms 
in those developed countries whose markets 
they wish to penetrate. There is potential in this 
sphere for associating private Central American 
capital with capital in the industrialized 
economies in an effort to broaden markets and 
develop more complex productive processes. 
Thirdly, it is possible to selectively 
encourage new export lines, particularly on the 
basis of exploitation of the region's natural 
resources. Products which show promise and 
which, in addition, are capable of being 
integrated into secondary activities include 
vegetables, citrus fruits, tropical fruit, hard 
fibres, pharmaceutical products, forestry and 
wood products, and seafood, including shrimp 
farming. In addition, subcontracting is a 
potential source of productive work as well as of 
foreign exchange. 
Fourthly, the potential for expanding and 
diversifying the manufacturing sector is far from 
exhausted. On the contrary, as a result of the 
abnormal way in which the Central American 
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Common Market has been operating in recent 
years, there is a backlog of projects whose 
viability depends on an improved climate for 
intra-regional co-operation, not only in order to 
supply demand on the subregional market, but 
also to penetrate outside markets, including of 
course the other Latin American countries. In 
this respect, mention should be made of the fact 
that Central America has already achieved a 
certain amount of success in transforming 
integration into a platform for extra-regional 
exports of manufactured goods (ECLAC, 1983b). 
In other words, today as in the past, import 
substitution under reasonable conditions of 
efficiency represents a means of enlarging the 
margin of action available to economic policy as 
well as of diversifying and increasing 
production. 
Finally, the region possesses potential for 
expanding its tertiary activities, including 
transport, tourism and financial services. The 
last of these may be of particular importance in 
restoring former levels of saving and 
investment, which will need to be tapped by 
more flexible and innovative instruments than 
those which exist at present. 
To sum up, and by way of an initial 
conclusion, it is possible to assert that the region 
possesses a human and natural resource base 
capable of permitting the sustained expansion of 
production. The central task will be to create the 
necessary institutions and forms of organization 
to take full advantage of this potential. 
3- Requirements of a policy of 
réactivation and development 
In the present climate of uncertainty and of 
sharp turnarounds in the international economy, 
and under the heavy burden of the accumulated 
lags described above, any policy of reactivation 
and development involves a set of minimum 
requirements which include pragmatism, 
selectiveness, austerity, efficiency and the search 
for means of satisfying the minimum 
requirements of those groups which constitute 
the majority of the population. 
a) Pragmatism 
One of the main problems which arises 
when formulating an economic policy is the 
uncertainty which largely stems from factors 
outside the control of the governments of the 
region. Reference has already been made to the 
doubts which have arisen as to the future 
evolution of the international economy, the 
changes which the industrialized economies 
must face, or the results of the policies being 
implemented in some of the main industrialized 
countries. It is not yet known what influence 
these factors could have in the countries of 
Central America, nor is there any clear 
perception of what the final outcome of the 
grave political and social tensions present in 
some countries of the subregion will be. 
The foregoing means that the economic 
policy of the Central American countries must be 
designed and applied with flexibility and realism 
so that it can be progressively adapted and 
adjusted to changing, unpredictable and basically 
unprecedented circumstances. This pragmatism 
will take various forms. First of all, flexibility 
and effective responses imply some degree of 
break with the past, because traditionally 
policies have tended to react passively or with 
considerable delay to the vicissitudes of the 
international economy. Today, in view of the 
risk that what we are facing is not so much a 
recessive cycle as a structural change in the world 
economy, it will be necessary to build a response 
capacity which will make it possible to take 
advantage of even the slightest opportunities 
and reduce as far as possible the factors limiting 
the development of the countries of the 
subregion: aspects which have particularly 
important repercussions as regards the role 
corresponding to the State. 
Secondly, notwithstanding the increasing 
conceptual polarization which prevails as 
regards the way in which economic development 
should be tackled, the pragmatic approach must, 
by definition, be anti-doctrinaire. This is not the 
moment to be trying out particular economic 
doctrines, as recent experience in Latin America 
has shown so eloquently. It is far more 
important to break with historical stereotypes: 
those governments which desire to give a 
leading role to the State cannot afford to refuse 
to provide incentives and their full support for 
private investment, nor should those which 
place their confidence in the market as the ¡deal 
resource allocation mechanism be scared of 
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assigning a more active role to the State. In other 
words, what present circumstances require is a 
search for the happy medium between extreme 
propositions for economic policy management 
(for example , be tween " l ibe ra l i za t ion" 
strategies and "inward-looking" strategies; 
between "distribution" and "growth"; between 
governmental and private action; between the 
application of policies in the financial field and 
in the real economy), as well as an innovative 
mixture of these. For example, there is no reason 
why a government should not return inefficient 
public enterprises to the private sector while 
simultaneously increasing the tax burden so as to 
tap greater funds in order to provide the 
population with basic services, or introduce 
agrarian reform designed to create a larger 
number of small agricultural entrepreneurs, 
while simultaneously encouraging saving and 
private investment by granting tax incentives. 
Thirdly, in view of the changing condition in 
the international economy, economic policies 
will need to take these new circumstances into 
account. It will be necessary to become reconciled 
to the fact that the era of fixed exchange rates 
and stable interest rates has given way to quite 
different systems, making it necessary for the 
application of those policies in Central America 
to be flexible and consistent with the aims 
pursued. 
Fourthly, and precisely as one means of 
adjusting the application of economic policy to 
changing circumstances, it will be necessary to 
cease insisting on universal approaches in favour 
of more pragmatic criteria of limited scope, 
designed to solve critical problems associated 
with reactivation and development, rather than 
to be a general panacea. This in no way means 
abandoning overall guidelines for efforts to 
achieve the aforementioned objectives, but it 
does involve placing greater reliance than in the 
past on a selective method of trial and error, as a 
means of advancing towards reactivation and 
adjusting economic policy as circumstances 
require. 
b) Selectiveness 
It will not be sufficient for the policy of 
reactivation and development to be applied 
pragmatically; it will also need to be selective. 
This concept too is many-sided. For example, the 
disarray in the international economy means 
that it is just as risky to direct the whole of 
economic policy towards encouraging dynamic 
insertion into world trade as it would be to adopt 
a policy which would make it impossible to take 
advantage of this trade. Economic policy should 
be sufficiently flexible and selective to be able to 
adjust to changing circumstances on external 
and domestic markets. Thus, contrary to what is 
generally assumed, the greatest threat nowadays 
to the efficiency of Central American industry is 
not so much exaggeratedly high tariff protection 
as the high levels of idle capacity which exist as a 
result of the fall in overall demand in each 
country and the barriers to intra-regional trade. 
Consequently, export promotion measures 
should not be adopted at the expense of 
destroying the hard-earned achievements of 
recent decades, but rather by selective and 
gradual application, in order that those articles 
with greatest potential access to international 
markets receive special incentives, while 
existing industry and a number of new activities 
may develop within a framework of reasonable 
protection in order to substitute imports. 
In the same line of ideas, economic policy in 
general, and public expenditure policy in 
particular, will need to be applied in a far more 
selective fashion than in the past, in keeping 
with the aims chosen. For example, it would be 
preferable to completely eliminate low-priority 
programmes from the national budgets rather 
than to cut all budget items by a fixed percentage. 
The same selectiveness could be applied to 
credit, fiscal and tariff policy. 
Finally, given the prevailing lack of 
confidence among the main economic agents, it 
would be unwise to leave reactivation policies at 
the mercy of the evolution of the international 
economy and solely dependent on the interplay 
of market forces. Thus, for example, in view of 
the acute shortage of foreign exchange affecting 
all the subregion's economies, it would be quite 
inappropriate to simply rely upon the interplay 
of supply and demand for foreign exchange as a 
means of setting exchange parity, especially 
since repressed needs and speculative pressures 
tend to value "hard" currencies above the level 
they deserve. Similarly, it would be equally risky 
to rely solely on administrative controls and 
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excessive centralization in the application of 
economic policy as a means of tackling 
maladjustments of external and of domestic 
origin. 
c) Austerity 
The widespread depression in Central 
America has been reflected in a number of 
restrictions associated with the need to reduce 
imports and ultimately levels of economic 
activity. The resulting austerity has by no means 
had an equal impact on the different strata of the 
population, however. The shortage of foreign 
exchange, the need to mobilize domestic saving 
in view of the restrictions on external financing, 
and the need to satisfy the most basic needs of 
the population make it necessary to ensure much 
more selective and careful use of the resources 
generated by exports and, in general, to follow a 
pattern of expenditure which closely respects 
priorities. In short, the new economic 
circumstances mean that the structures of 
expenditure and saving must also be adapted to 
them, and this should be reflected in austerity 
consumption patterns in both the private and 
public sectors. 
This austerity should have a dual aim: to save 
foreign exchange through the reduction of 
consumption of non-essential goods and services 
which are either imported or have a high 
imported content, and to increase the coefficient 
of saving. As regards the first of these aspects, 
the countries of the region must use the foreign 
exchange they manage to obtain from their 
exports with the greatest care and strictest 
selectivity, which will involve, among other 
features, realistic exchange rates. As regards 
consumption, governments will need to 
discourage the consumption of non-essential 
goods and services of external origin, while they 
should take maximum advantage of national and 
subregional potential for supplying demand. 
Setting a high value on thrift rather than 
extravagance could be reflected in a different life 
style from that of the past, particularly among 
the middle- and high-income groups of Central 
American societies. There is of course no 
question of further lowering the living standards 
of the majority of the population who already 
live on the threshold of poverty. On the contrary, 
the reactivation policy also involves an effort at 
redistribution which among other features, 
should provide greater support for the 
satisfaction of the population's basic needs. 
As regards investment, everything points to 
the desirability of looking once again at the 
possibilities of using more labour-intensive 
technlogies, not only because of the pressing 
need to create jobs, but also because of the need 
to reduce the imported component in new fixed 
capital. 
Improving the selective utilization of the 
foreign exchange generated by exports means 
that the governments of the subregion must do 
their utmost to rationalize public expenditure 
and reorient it towards truly essential activities. 
The foregoing assumes particular importance 
because, on the one hand, the persistence of the 
international crisis and other factors of a 
domestic nature foreshadow the intensification 
of social pressures on governments and, on the 
other hand, the markedly open nature of the 
Central American economies imposes strict 
limits on the deficit financing of public 
expenditure because of its inflationary impact 
and its repercussions on the balance of 
payments. In this respect, it will be necessary to 
suppress luxury or non-essential expenditure 
and to seek to advance in the political detente of 
the region, so as to be able to transfer part of the 
resources now devoted to military purposes to 
the promotion of development. 
Furthermore, public expenditure itself could 
help to reduce the external imbalance if, in 
selecting investments, preference is given to 
projects which require a high proportion of 
national or subregional imports. At all events, 
the public sector will have to increase its 
procurement of revenue in line with its 
expenditure, in order to prevent financial 
deficits from contributing to inflationary 
demand for imported goods. 
d) iifficicncy 
Another basic requirement of a reactivation 
policy is that it should defend growth based on 
increased efficiency and productivity. In the 
present circumstances, improving efficiency is 
absolutely essential, both from the macro and 
micro economic point of view, in order to 
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increase the multiplier effects of savings and 
investments, to substitute imports on reasonably 
competitive terms, or to maintain and expand 
exports to international markets. It is the duty of 
the State to improve the efficiency of those 
services which it provides and to encourage the 
improvement of the productivity of enterprises 
through fiscal and credit measures. 
A significant increase in efficiency and 
employment in the subregion can be achieved 
without having to resort to imports of capital 
goods, by making full use of the existing installed 
capacity. There is considerable idle capacity, 
above all in almost all branches of the 
manufacturing sector. There is also ample room 
for considerably increasing the productivity per 
hectare in the case of most agricultural products, 
even those where the countries have had the 
greatest success with their exports. 
e) Reducing poverty 
If it did not prove possible to bring about any 
significant reduction in extreme poverty even 
during the thirty years of dynamic expansion of 
the Central American economies (although 
broad sections of the population were integrated 
into modern economic activity during that time) 
it is inevitable that the situation should grow 
worse as the economic crisis persists, since there 
is a direct interrelation between levels of 
employment and marginality. In recent years, 
open unemployment and underemployment 
have increased, and unless some way of avoiding 
this is found, this tendency will be aggravated in 
the future, in view of the rapid rate of growth of 
the economically active population. 
Unless the State takes clear measures in 
favour of the masses, the depressive effects of 
the crisis —and of the austerity policies 
accompanying it— will tend to have a 
disproportionately severe impact on these 
groups, which are the least well organized to 
defend themse lves , and among o ther 
consequences, this will bring about a widening of 
the gulf between the governing and the 
governed. 
The spread of absolute poverty is 
unacceptable from any point of view. However, a 
policy aimed at satisfying the basic needs of the 
masses is hard to implement even in times of 
rapid economic expansion, and still more 
difficult to achieve at times of severe restrictions, 
including those affecting public finances. At all 
events, the elimination of poverty is an essential 
part of the development approach which is 
called for. Without it, all efforts to overcome the 
crisis would be meaningless, since the spread of 
social discontent could make social tensions 
unmanageable and make it impossible to retain 
savings and thereby revive the process of 
investment and development. 
It is necessary to find some way of satisfying 
the basic needs of the populations which 
involves a relatively low imported component, 
in order to keep within the foreign exchange 
restrictions. At all events, and quite apart from 
considerations of equity, the political crisis in 
many countries of Central America has reached 
the point at which it is absolutely indispensable 
to restore a minimum of peaceful understanding 
among the population. If this is not done, then 
the social instability will inevitably be 
transformed into economic instability by 
paralyzing, for example, the process of capital 
formation and leading to a kind of State-
dominated expenditure which would be of little 
help in expanding productive activities. 
4. The role of intra-regional 
co-operation 
Beyond any doubt, intra-regional co-operation 
offers the best possibility of loosening the 
constraints imposed by the external sector on 
the Central American economies, in line with 
the need to establish bases for reactivation and 
development set forth in this article. Today, 
more than ever, it is necessary to press on with 
the programme which was begun in Central 
America nearly thirty years ago and which has 
borne such valuable fruits and experience. It is 
necessary to do so not only in order to take 
advantage of the more dynamic impulses which 
could be expected from domestic demand 
(understood on a subregional basis) but also in 
order to face up jointly to certain specific 
features of the subregion's relations with the rest 
of the world. This aspect has been dealt with on a 
number of occasions in ECLAC documents, but it 
acquires fresh interest in the present 
circumstances. 
44 CEPAL REVIEW No. 28 / April 1986 
The aim would be, through intra-Central 
American co-operation, to increase the scanty 
room for action available to each of the 
individual countries of the subregion, in order to 
thus lessen the effects of the depression of the 
external sector. In the short term, the only 
effective way of expanding local demand seems 
to be that connected with co-operative efforts at 
the subregional level. There is nothing new 
about such a procedure, since as long ago as in 
the 1950s it was successfully put into practice in 
order to overcome the same obstacle, namely, 
the bottleneck to growth constituted by 
international demand. Now, however, it would 
be adopted in a different situation. If it were 
possible to increase intra-regional trade to the 
maximum, this would make an effective 
contribution to economic reactivation by making 
maximum use of installed capacity, reducing the 
influence of the adverse effects of external sector 
phenomena, increasing efficiency —both for 
import substitution and for improving 
competitiveness on international markets— and 
even taking joint advantage of the opportunities 
which the international market may continue to 
offer. 
In recent years all of this has been hindered 
by the barriers standing in the way of intra-
regional trade. It would be unrealistic to defend 
unrestricted free trade which did not take 
account of the greater or lesser importance of the 
goods being traded, but it would be desirable at 
all events to keep restrictions to the minimum 
and even to adopt mechanisms to give 
preference to reciprocal trade over similar trade 
flows with third countries. In this way alone 
could optimum use be made of the installed 
capacity of the subregion, while even perhaps 
also promoting some new activities based on 
subregional demand. For this purpose, the 
countries would need to adopt new procedures 
for financing the intra-Central American trade 
debit balances, to do away with certain 
restrictions at present resulting from the 
exchange controls adopted, and, in general 
terms, to give essentially the same treatment Co 
products originating from any other Central 
American country as to those produced 
domestically. There is no shortage of concrete 
ideas in the subregion for bringing this about. 
Furthermore, as already noted, regional co-
operation is the best way of improving the use 
made of the opportunities offered by the 
international economy, both in order to increase 
exports —on the basis, for example, of common 
marketing systems— and in order to obtain 
additional external financing for projects and 
initiatives which are of interest to all. The 
strengthening of the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration and of the machinery 
available through the Central American 
Monetary Council are examples of some 
measures which would give real force to this 
latter idea. It should be remembered that lack of 
intra-regional co-ordínation in such a vital area 
as external financing not only has a high 
opportunity cost —if the possibilities for joint 
mobilization of a flow of resources which could 
not be obtained through individual negotiations 
are lost— but also represents a risk for the 
survival of intra-Central American co-operation. 
It has been noted that various actors on the 
international scene seem to be interested in 
providing co-operation to the Central American 
countries on a selective basis, with the exclusion 
of one or more countries from their 
programmes. In this respect, external co-
operation would tend to separate the Central 
American countries rather than uniting them. 
Making intra-regional co-operation one of 
the pillars of reactivation and development will 
call, in the first instance, for the simple 
preservation of the degree of economic 
interdependence already reached, while 
subsequently promoting joint action to correct 
or relieve common problems. There would be no 
question, of course, of seeking to promote 
instant integration of the economies of the 
region or co-operation in every single one of 
their activities. What would be sought for would 
be rather to make integration a useful 
instrument for tackling the reactivation of each 
country. Thus, for example, tariff policy —which 
has traditionally been the subject of joint 
action— could play a key role in the application 
of a more selective and flexible system, 
simultaneously ensuring both protection of 
existing industrial plants and the promotion of 
exports. In addition, although there is no 
question of establishing regional commitments 
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which restrict each country's possibility to 
formulate its own exchange policies, it is clear 
that the existence of the common market will 
call for a minimum of co-ordination in this 
sphere, which will further facilitate the adoption 
of decisions to meet the needs of reactivation. 
The schedule of integration activities over 
the next two years will need to incorporate 
measures which, while preserving the economic 
interdependence already achieved between the 
countries of the subregion, will facilitate the 
adoption of policies linked to the programme 
under discussion. Noteworthy among these 
issues are: i) the continuation and perhaps 
intensification of joint action vis-a-vis the 
international financial community in order to 
mobilize external funds so as to provide foreign 
exchange liquidity for those regional 
mechanisms which ensure the fluidity of intra-
regional trade; ü) increasing the flow of external 
funds for i n d u s t r i a l r e a c t i v a t o n ; 
iii) transforming the Central American 
common tariff into an instrument of the 
reactivation and development policy, taking 
advantage of the recent signing of the agreement 
on the Central American Tariff and Customs 
Régime;11 iv) stimulating joint action to 
improve the access of Central American 
products to the markets of third countries; 
v) drawing up partial agreements, in co-
ordination with other countries in Latin 
America, so as to harmonize the steps towards 
Central American integration with the need to 
expand the geographical area of this integration; 
vi) coming to grips with the specific problem of 
those countries which do not reap the full 
benefits of intra-ragional trade, by devising 
means for allowing Nicaragua's exports to the 
rest of the region to increase as well as for the 
gradual and progressive incorporation of 
Honduras into the multilateral integration 
commitments; vü) carrying out joint projects of 
mul t ina t iona l in te res t , such as the 
interconnection of electricity systems and co-
operation in the exploitation of marine 
resources and, viii) strengthening the Central 
"Signed in Guatemala on 14 December 1984 by the 
governments of Costa Rica and El Salvador, and on 27 December 
1984 by the governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua. 
American integration institutions so that they 
can help to carry out the activities in question. 
5. The political expression 
of development and the role 
of the State 
Although this article has focused on the role of 
economic policy —and by implication, on that of 
economists— in reactivation and development, 
it is clear that this is not the exclusive preserve, 
or even the main one, of economists. The 
transformations inherent in any development 
process affect all areas of national life (and all of 
the social science disciplines) and it is hardly 
possible to design programmes of reactivation 
and development without incorporating 
considerations of a social and political nature. 
Thus, should it not prove possible to overcome 
the persistent tension in a number of Central 
American countries, it would be pointless to 
consider reactivating their economies. In other 
words, it is necessary to adopt a multidisciplinary 
approach to development so that economics can 
incorporate such issues as participation, political 
interaction, the role of the various economic 
agents and democratization. 
Th i s does not mean tha t the 
multidisciplinary approach must be adopted in 
all activities connected with the development 
effort. The formulation of economic policy 
proposals remains principally the task of 
economists, the study of political interaction that 
of political scientists, and research into social 
stratification that of sociologists. Nevertheless, 
there will be numerous areas of contact and 
overlapping between economic, political and 
social factors, and a reactivation and 
development programme will consequently 
need to tackle at least some of the non-economic 
factors present in the region, as already indicated 
in this article. 
This is no place to develop this issue in 
depth. Nevertheless, it is necessary to make a 
few remarks concerning the role which the State 
could play, merely in order to provide an 
illustration of the complex interrelations 
between economic and non-economic factors in 
this great task facing the Central American 
governments and peoples. Why should 
particular attention be devoted to the role of the 
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State? Firstly, because this article is intended 
essentially for the region's governments, and it 
would be incomplete if it failed to examine the 
role incumbent upon them in reactivation and 
development. Secondly, the issue is highly 
controversial —sometimes with marked 
ideological overtones— and deserves both broad 
debate and deeper subsequent research. Finally, 
irrespective of the ideological and conceptual 
framework surrounding the issue, each of the 
generic functions carried out by any State 
—preserving order, defending sovereignty and 
ensuring the well-being of the population— is 
reflected in the central preoccupations 
underlying this article, such as how to overcome 
the social and political tension in the region, to 
reduce the marked influence exerted by 
phenomena of external origin on all aspects of 
national activity, and to reactivate the 
economies. The issue is thus clearly of 
considerable importance. 
Nevertheless, the role played by the State 
may vary considerably in detail from one country 
to the next, or within a single country at 
different periods of time, depending upon the 
existing institutional and political organizaton, 
historical and cultural tradition, the result of 
political interaction and a number of diverse 
circumstances. 
This question also involves ethical and 
philosophical considerations (for example, if it 
is accepted that the State plays a leading role, is it 
entitled to use any means, including force, to 
influence events? What bounds are to be set to 
the procedures which the State may adopt to 
achieve this end?). These problems are ali clearly 
evident in present day Central America, in view 
of the heterogeneity of the situations existing in 
the region. 
In a number of countries the power of the 
State is perceived as the result of permanent 
tensions between different agents within 
society, with its bounds being set by other 
centres of power and by the rule of law. In other 
countries, there is a tendency to endow the State 
with a hegemonic (but not necessarily absolute) 
role, in certain cases as the representative of 
particular sectors of society. It is consequently 
impossible to define a single formula, applicable 
to each and every one of the countries, regarding 
the precise role which the State should assume in 
the process of reactivation and development, 
that is to say, with regard to its generic role as 
guardian of the population's well-being. Indeed, 
the very same criteria applicable to reactivation 
policy, as referred to earlier (pragmatism, 
selectiveness, efficiency and austerity), are 
relevant to defining both this role and the 
relations of the State with the other economic 
agents in society. In addition to these criteria, it 
is necessary to take full account of the 
heterogeneity of situations and to ensure that 
there is capacity to adjust the role of the State to 
changing circumstances. 
Thirty years of Central American experience 
would seem to indicate that there is no universal 
rule to permit an ex ante definition of the degree 
of State intervention desirable for maximizing 
the population's well-being. It has to be 
acknowledged that the performance of the State 
during this period has not always been 
satisfactory, as is illustrated by the cases of a 
number of public enterprises or official 
industrial development institutions. The fact 
that a number of these enterprises have been 
victims of bureaucratization, sinecures, and even 
occasionally corruption and ineptitude in their 
administration, should not automatically lead to 
the conclusion that they are perforce inefficient. 
Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that the 
fashionable trend during these thirty postwar 
years towards the systematic expansion of the 
scope and depth of State action has not always 
proved intrinsically desirable, and in general the 
State's activities should have to meet the same 
requirements of efficiency, honesty and 
flexibility as those of other economic agents. On 
the other hand, it would be equally wrong to 
conclude from this performance that the State 
must withdraw from playing a major role in 
development, and instead rely on the market as 
the sole arbitrator of this process. 
It would be more consistent with Central 
American circumstances to accept that the 
degree of State intervention in the economy or 
the influence allowed market forces should 
depend on the prevailing conditions in each 
country. Basically, apart from the family and the 
home, the two most important organizational 
institutions in the world are the market and the 
State (Lindblom, 1977, p. II). For this reason, 
once the necessary presence of both these 
CENTRAL AMERICAN REACTIVATION AND DEVELOPMENT / ECLAC Mexico Subregional Headquarters 47 
"organizational institutions" in any political 
system —including socialist economies— has 
been acknowledged, the greatest distinction 
between one government and the next lies in the 
degree to which the market replaces the 
government or to which the government 
replaces the market (Lindblom, 1977, p. IX). 
One way of perceiving the role played by the 
State, then, would involve observing the tense 
and dynamic relationship between the two 
organizational institutions —the market and the 
State— described above: tense because they are 
constantly face to face, each sounding out the 
limits of the other; dynamic because changing 
circumstances lead to modifications in the 
relative weight of each, as well as to changes in 
their interrelationships. For this reason, during 
periods of intense change such as those which 
Latin America is experiencing at the present 
time it is unavoidable that both the role of the 
State and that of the market will also undergo 
changes. Both interact with one another in a 
creative state of tension. 
Once this approach has been accepted, it is 
neither possible nor necessary to put forward a 
universal rule for the role which the State ought 
to play in a region containing situations so 
diverse as those in Central America. There 
would be no point in abstractly proclaiming 
either a hegemonic role for the State or the 
universal virtue of the market. The relative 
share of each of them in the evolution of events 
will depend on the dynamics of the development 
process itself as well as on the prevailing 
circumstances in each country. 
However, if the features of the present 
situation are scrutinized it is apparent that the 
public sector possesses room for action which it 
should use not only to soften the harmful impact 
of the crisis, but also to orientate the effects of 
the crisis in a constructive direction. For 
example, the shortage of foreign exchange 
requires the establishment of an order of priority 
for the different importing sectors and means, 
moreover, that income from exports should be 
specifically devoted to essential imports. In 
addition, present circumstances require a major 
effort directed at exports. It seems logical that 
the central banks and the offices responsible for 
external trade should assume responsibility for 
these functions. At ail events, the obligation to 
rationalize the use of foreign exchange requires 
greater State intervention than is required under 
normal circumstances of external relations. 
Moreover, the shortage of foreign exchange 
leads to conflicts of interest and, consequently, 
pressures from the various groups of importers 
and exporters. The clashes which invariably 
arise as a result of these situations can only be 
solved through the arbitration of a higher 
authority. In this respect, regardless of the 
combination of exchange, credit or fiscal 
formulae adopted in order to face the crisis, the 
shortage of resources automatically intensifies 
the struggle between the interest groups and 
thereby opens up —as a result of the 
fragmentation of demands— a broader area for 
public-sector intervention. 
Another qualitative change in the role 
played by the public sector springs from its 
lesseer dependence on international trade as a 
direct source of tax income. The decisive role 
which exports have played in the past has led to 
taxes on external trade being of considerable 
weight in public-sector income, but this situation 
will change as the external depression restricts 
the possibilities for exports and, as a 
counterpart, those for imports. Consequently, 
financial problems will arise until new domestic 
sources of taxation can be found, but, 
simultaneously, the State will become less 
vulnerable to specific pressure groups. 
These considerations all illustrate the way in 
which the prevailing situation affects the role of 
the State, regardless of the conceptual and 
ideological framework of each Central American 
society. Naturally the exact nature and scope of 
its responsibilities will vary from one country to 
the next as circumstances dictate in each country, 
as a result of the interaction between the State 
and the other economic agents. In this respect, 
the execution of its activities by the State in the 
manner described would be the natural 
counterpart of the pragmatic approach put 
forward earlier with respect to the management 
of economic policy, with less emphasis on global 
and universal frameworks, but instead selective 
methods involving a process of trial and error in 
order to achieve given development aims. 
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